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 Exploitation through the lens of structural injustice: re-visiting global commercial 
surrogacy 
Agomoni Ganguli Mitra 
University of Edinburgh 
(Chapter accepted for publication in forthcoming book on exploitation) 
 
In this paper, I use the context of commercial surrogacy in India to revisit the claim that 
global commercial surrogates are being exploited. I argue, that in order achieve a better 
understanding of exploitation, we must consider structural injustices more seriously than we 
currently do. Using Iris Marion Young’s approach to structural justice, I partially move away 
from the liberal tradition, which tends to focus on the contractual arrangements of an 
interaction, without discarding it altogether. The central claim is that it is not just the unfair 
terms of a transaction, but also the unfairness arising from the deeper inequalities embedded 
in the social-structural processes, that substantiate the moral truth of the exploitation claim. 
These include cultural, legal, political and economic aspects, and moral failure on the part of 
various agents and at various levels. As long as deep structural inequalities and injustices 
exist, many arrangements made under such conditions, which other actors directly profit 
from, can be considered instances of exploitation, regardless of the terms of the transaction. 
The upshot of this approach is that an exploitative arrangement can have both transactional 
and structural components, either of which might be sufficient in rendering an arrangement 
exploitative. 
 
a. Commercial surrogacy in India 
Until very recently, commercial surrogacy was a thriving business in India, both at the 
national and international levels. While commercial surrogacy remains illegal most countries, 
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India, a global hub for medical tourism, had also come to be known as the surrogacy 
‘outsourcing’ capital of the world 1 . In the few other jurisdictions where commercial 
surrogacy is legal, it continues to be expensive, often prohibitively so for many prospective 
parents—costing anywhere between $50,000 to $120,0002. India on the other hand, is yet to 
fully regulate this $445 million dollar industry3. Late in 2015, the government passed a ban 
restricting access to surrogacy to Indian nationals and their spouses 4 . The Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill or ART(R) Bill—the central piece of legislation 
intended to regulate the surrogacy sector, periodically considered by parliament over the 
years before being repeatedly shelved—is currently out in its latest iteration (which includes 
this restriction) and is yet to be considered by parliament5,  
For international commissioning parents, India has been a particularly attractive 
destination, due to its large pool of potential surrogates; skilled English-speaking medical 
staff, hospitals with good infrastructure; and the fact few surrogates have the resources, legal 
or financial, to claim the baby post-birth.6 The lack of comprehensive regulation so far has 
also meant that contracting parties—usually prospective parents and their agents on the one 
hand, and Indian clinics on the other—are left to make their own private arrangements as to 
the terms of the contract. Surrogates are reportedly paid between $2,500 to $7,000, and the 
total cost to prospective parents range between $10,000 and $35,000.7  
There are reportedly over 3000 surrogacy clinics operating across India8. Although 
many of the empirical studies have been conducted in Gujarat9 such clinics are now sprouting 
in many of the major cities, and that poorer women are often targeted for recruitment.10 
Indeed, most potential surrogates live around, or below the poverty line, and there is little 
doubt that the primary motivation for entering a surrogacy arrangement is financial.11 The 
money surrogates receive would otherwise take them and their families years to earn, in the 
best of cases. Paid surrogacy arrangements are taken on by women in an effort to pay off 
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family debts, contribute to the children’s education, or to household expenditures. In some 
cases potential surrogates are the main, or sole earners in the family12. 
While primary consideration for agreeing to act as a surrogate may be of financial 
nature, grouping these concerns under the label of poverty is misleading. Women lack 
employment options not only because there is a lack of stable, well-paid employment 
opportunities. Opportunities are also scarce because few women have access to formal 
education.13 Alternative work can only be found in the unregulated sector, and involves work 
that is poorly paid, exhausting and often dangerous. 14  Women suffer from wage 
discrimination in every employment sector, regardless of their educational background. Work 
in the field or on construction sites is gruelling; lacks access to adequate sanitary facilities, 
and protection against violence and sexual harassment. Safety and lack of sanitation are also 
among the main reasons many young girls drop out of primary education, leaving them with 
very little opportunity for future employment.  
These factors however, are simpler to pin point. India is culturally pro-natal15, but 
also deeply patriarchal. Much importance is given to the male biological offspring, and as a 
result reproduction becomes central most women’s lives and status. Preference for the male 
child is reinforced not just socially, but also indirectly by political and economic factors16. By 
the same token, the social status of female infants, young girls, and women remains subject to 
a strong web of class, caste	and gender-discrimination. Inheritance, to a great extent, remains 
culturally patrilineal, and marriages are patrilocal (requiring the bride to leave her ancestral 
home or village to live with her husband’s family) and often hypergamous (allowing the 
bride’s family to marry ‘higher up’ in the caste and class hierarchy, by offering a large dowry 
and organizing and expensive wedding).  Social rigidity around sexual purity and family 
honor means that most women are married young, while still considered ‘pure’, and therefore 
further reducing their educational and employment opportunities. According to a recent 
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UNICEF report, over 18% of girls are married by the age of 15 and a staggering 47% by the 
age of 18, making India the global leader in child brides17. India also fares low in terms of 
reproductive and maternal health, as well as infant mortality. In other words, commercial 
surrogacy flourishes in a context of deep inequality; were girls are given fewer opportunities 
in terms of health, education and employment; where they are married young, away from 
their families; and left with little other than their own reproductive assets, the very 
capabilities that make surrogacy so compelling.  
Beyond social inequalities, there is also injustice enabled by failures of various 
institutions, and institutional actors. India has a plethora of law in place intended to protect 
women’s interest, including rights to education and inheritance, laws against sex-selection, 
dowry, caste-discrimination and early marriage. However, the country also suffers from 
widespread corruption and laxity at all levels of governance and law-enforcement, medical 
and legal institutions, creating a situation where women and girls are largely at the mercy of 
their fate, families and communities.  
While it may be tempting to portray surrogacy means to escape a myriad of 
inequalities, it is important to note that discrimination or unfairness is sometimes reproduced 
in within the context of surrogacy itself. Surrogacy is often considered work akin to 
prostitution in the popular mind and surrogates often have to resort to various methods of 
deception in order to escape the stigma they and their families might face from their 
communities.18  Patriarchal, paternalistic and discriminatory norms are widespread even 
within the best clinics. Skin colour and caste apparently play a central role in the surrogate’s 
power to negotiate the terms of agreement, and fairness, light hair and eyes, as well as high 
IQ is greatly in demand, also by Indian couples.19 Women are often required to reside in 
supervised hostels where their freedom and movements are heavily curtailed for the sake of a 
healthy pregnancy and a successful transaction.20 
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Finally, commercial surrogacy in India is flourishing under a pro-business, political 
and economic atmosphere, in a country that is keen on attracting private investment to its 
health sector. 21   Regardless of whether commercial surrogacy as such commodifies 
reproductive labour 22, potential surrogates are choosing this work in a context where several 
factors have already taught them to devote their lives and identities to the service of 
procreation and childcare. This aligns itself well with the aspirations23 of the current Indian 
surrogacy industry, set to become a leader in the region. Ethnographic findings suggest that 
many surrogacy arrangements are set up in a way as to further reinforce the ‘transient role 
and disposability of the women, not just as workers but also as mothers’ 24, and merely 
represent a further step towards establishing the women’s reproductive capacities as skills for 
business, leading to the creation of what ethnographer Amrita Pande calls the perfect mother-
worker.25 While there are popular reports of brokers scouring city slums, looking for potential 
surrogates, recent empirical studies show that surrogates are most often recruited by other 
women from within their own communities, often themselves former surrogates. 26 The loci 
of negotiations in these cases rest on relations and exchanges that operate ‘extra-legally’ and 
are very much dependent on the existing societal relationship. Formal contracts and their 
terms are established well after surrogates have accepted to enter the arrangements.27 And so 
the business thrives on existing social connections, understanding and trust.  
My main purpose in devoting some time towards illustrating the Indian context is to 
establish the background considerations that I believe are crucial components of the 
exploitation claim. Using the example of national and international commercial surrogacy in 
India, I revisit the claim that global commercial surrogacy is exploitative. Given the stark 
socio-structural inequalities most surrogates face, many in fact, are being exploited. 
Following Iris Marion Young’s approach to structural justice, I suggest that a proper account 
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of exploitation should take into consideration structural fairness (as well as transactional 
fairness), and so the exploitation claim will necessarily be heavily context-dependent.  
 
b. Parameters of the exploitation claim 
I begin with the position that exploitation, in its moralized sense, broadly involves ‘taking 
wrongful advantage’28, that is, it describes a situation where one or more person(s) benefit(s) 
at the expense of others, in a manner that can be described as morally wrong. I do not 
consider here whether we need to, or indeed can, achieve a unified account of exploitation,29  
While the concept of exploitation has largely evolved away from its historical 
economic roots,30 one predominant view, most famously developed by Alan Wertheimer,31 
closely associates exploitation with the unfair distribution of benefits and burdens in an 
exchange. Given that my line of argument also focuses on fairness, it is worth outline the 
ways in which such an account resembles, and departs from Wertheimer’s own account. 
According to Wertheimer, ‘A exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of B32’. As 
stated, this can refer to other a defect in the process (when for example consent is coerced or 
manipulated), or to the unfairness in the outcome of the exchange (if for example A benefits 
excessively compared to B). In Wertheimer’s view the harm in non-consensual exchanges is 
easier to pinpoint and theoretically less interesting, since a defect in consent is a form of 
wrong in itself, independent to the exploitation claim.33 A moral defect in the outcome, 
however, is ‘both necessary and sufficient to constitute exploitation.’34 
First, Wertheimer’s account relates to the fairness of the terms of an agreement, and 
this focuses our attention to the micro-fairness35 aspects, polarizing the debate around 
(financial) terms, at the expense of the broader picture. Such an approach fails to portray 
some of the problematic features of global commercial surrogacy, such as the ones described 
in the context of India, and which should be pertinent to the exploitation claim. A structural 
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account of inequality and justice, I argue, can also consider fairness, but unlike Wertheimer’s 
approach, it steers our attention to broader, but pertinent considerations. This does not mean 
we should discard the transactional account of exploitation. On the contrary, as far as 
concerns a fairness-based account of exploitation, we should consider both transactional and 
structural components.  
Second, if commercial surrogacy in India is correctly labelled as exploitative, it is fair 
assume that it is usually the kind of exploitation that Wertheimer describes as mutually 
advantageous:36 an arrangement that relevant parties (exploiter and exploited) benefit from ex 
ante. In such cases, all parties involved are expected to be better off from entering the 
arrangement than otherwise, as long as surrogates are compensated for their service.  
Third, I agree with Wertheimer, that it is important to separate two aspects of the 
exploitation claim: its moral truth, that is, whether an arrangement is correctly labelled as 
exploitative, and its moral force, that is, developing the normative implications arising from 
such a label, for example imposing legal restrictions on such arrangements. It is not because 
an arrangement is correctly described as exploitative, that it should necessarily be banned. I 
am mostly concerned here with the moral truth of the exploitation claim, although I do 
consider some of its moral force and practical implications in the latter part of the discussion. 
This distinction is helpful because otherwise the apparent strength of the moral imperative 
and its practical implications for regulation often obscure the nuances and concerns that 
prompt the discussion in the first place.  
Clearly from the analogy that Wertheimer uses however, I would argue that 
characterizing an exploitative arrangement as one involving two parties, A and B, is highly 
problematic. As David Resnik argues in the context of global clinical trials, the often-used 
symbolic transaction between A and B may in fact involve many people37, each with their 
own agendas and interests, relationships and position of power38. Focusing on two parties, A 
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and B, unhelpfully ushers us back micro-fairness approach to exploitation, and away from 
other morally relevant contextual details, factors and actors.  
 
c. Structural inequality as a foundation for the exploitation claim 
The essence of my claim is that taking advantage of injustice can be considered a component 
of exploitation, and not merely, for example a form complicity with injustice39 or another 
kind of wrong, and that this can be true regardless of whether the terms of the agreement are 
fair.  This approach connects the fairness component of the exploitation claim to an account 
of structural injustice.  Iris Marion Young argues that: 
 
‘Structural injustice exists when social processes put large categories of persons under 
a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise 
their capacities, at the same time as these processes enable others to dominate or have 
a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities’.40  
 
This is precisely the context in which commercial surrogacy flourishes in India, where many 
surrogates find themselves at the receiving end of injustice, not all of which can be clearly 
attributed to individual fault or a specific unfair policy 41, but that still positions them in a 
web of inequality that makes surrogacy work so compelling. Young argues ‘[t]hat the issue of 
social justice raised by the operation of social structures is whether these differences in the 
kinds and range of options made available to individual by these structures are fair’42. The 
many social and structural constraints that give rise to inequality in the Indian context—from 
cultural rigidity, to poverty, to corruption, among others—mean that surrogates are not only 
in a difficult bargaining position when it comes to the terms of the arrangement, but that they 
face a severely restricted and unfair range of options when it comes to making the choice to 
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undertake surrogacy work in the first place. It is only when the gender-based inequalities 
become apparent that the moral wrong of exploitation becomes salient in this context. In 
Young’s words: ‘one important purpose for taking a large-scale point of view on a society 
and locating positions in a structural field is to identify broad structural inequalities that are 
far-reaching in their implications for people’s life courses and that persist over time, often 
over generations.’43 A comprehensive view of exploitation also requires us, in certain cases, 
to take such a broad view. Restricting our lens in the manner suggested by Wertheimer may 
be enough in characterizing exploitation in certain contexts. However, that picture is 
incomplete in the case of global surrogacy generally, and in the Indian context in particular.  
There, the deeper moral wrong of exploitation arises from the social and structural 
inequalities that position women, in various positions of injustice.  Ruth Sample has argued 
that ‘exploitation is not simply a feature of a particular transaction but derives its badness 
from preexisting social institutions that underwrite and encourage the transaction’.44 
Differing slightly from Sample, who identifies exploitation and an instance of degradation, I 
would argue however, that the conditions described above, lead us to consider exploitation as 
an arising from unfairness and systematic cultural, legal and political injustice, rather than a 
form of disrespect.  
 
It is therefore important to characterize exploitation, not just as the feature of an 
arrangement between A and B, but as several actors taking advantage of an unjust situation 
that some of them have contributed to, or which they continue to reinforce through such 
practices, in order to satisfy their own goals, needs and desires. As long as the injustices 
exist, and as long as certain actors and institutions continue to benefit from them through, for 
example the establishment of surrogacy transactions and industries, the arrangements made 
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under such conditions—however fair the terms of transaction may be—can be rightfully 
considered exploitative.  
Wertheimer considers exploitation a transactional or interactional norm 45 . The 
relevant parties have to enter into an arrangement or exchange that can then be characterized 
as exploitative or not. An arrangement can have both transactional and structural components 
of exploitation, and indeed I would argue that many arrangements that can be correctly 
described as exploitative probably have an element of both, as do many global commercial 
surrogacy arrangements. Either component can be sufficient for the exploitation claim. In 
other words, it could be that the background injustices are so egregious as to render any 
arrangements and exchanges in those contexts exploitative, in a way that no compensation 
resulting from the arrangement could alleviate. Alternatively, it could be equally plausible 
that the structural concerns are all but minimal, so much so that exploitation remains only a 
feature of the particular contractual terms. As I discuss later, it could also be that in certain 
cases the structural component of the claim can be overridden by achieving fairer terms, but I 
remain unconvinced that is the case for global commercial surrogacy.  
A proper characterization of exploitation requires some attention to the question of 
moral responsibility. In this case, the morally responsible actors are many. In the first 
instance, Vida Panitch has rightly argued that we should put a significant amount of moral 
blame onto the Indian state. 46 The State has failed to protect the rights, agency and interests 
of girls by failing to enforce the institutional, legal, educational, cultural processes and equal 
opportunities that would allow girls and women to lead flourishing lives. I would further 
argue that the State is also implicated in exploitation because it derives direct benefits from, 
and continues to encourage an industry that heavily relies on existing injustices, some of 
which the it has enabled (for example, but not coming down more heavily on illegal marriage 
practices, among other things).  Second, the physicians, brokers and other persons directly 
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involved in the surrogacy industry are not just complicit to injustice, but are also involved in 
exploitation, as far as their professional and financial gains also depend on the existing 
structural injustices.47 Last but not least, let’s turn out attention to prospective parents. The 
discussion regarding moral blameworthiness in global commercial surrogacy has often 
concentrated on non-Indian couples, commissioning surrogacy as medical tourists from high-
income countries. Parry’s recent work however suggests that many of the commissioning 
parents within the Indian surrogacy industry are in fact Indians, residing in India. 48 
Prospective parents taking advantage of structural injustice include, individuals from other 
countries, non-resident Indians and Indian residents themselves, many of whom also49 seem 
to perpetuate existing race- or caste-based discrimination. Evidence from Parry’s work also 
suggests that we should move away from the traditional narrative of the North-South divide, 
of surrogacy as violence perpetrated by the white body on the brown body50, and rather 
concentrate on the many inequalities: relational, social, structural that come into play at the 
local, national and global levels. Moral responsibility fore exploitation should therefore be 
assigned to several actors, who either profit from existing injustices, from injustices that they 
have enabled or causes; or from injustices that they further reinforce by perpetuating unfair 
practices and norms.  
 The inevitable question then arises as to the normative implications, or moral force of 
this type of exploitation. According to Wertheimer, we have good reasons to allow mutually 
advantageous exploitation to take place, as long as consent is valid,51 especially if both 
parties, in particular the exploited party, would be worse off otherwise. The normative and 
regulatory implications of the exploitation claim require far more in-depth discussion than I 
am able to explore here.  To allow mutually advantageous exploitation will depend on how 
severe either components of the exploitation claim are: for example how deep the 
inequalities, how bad the terms or how egregious the wrong is in relation to the inequalities 
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or deprivation the exploited individual otherwise faces, and to the extent to which the practice 
further reinforces injustice. Such moral force could take the form of restrictions to the 
exploitative arrangements, and/or the form of positive obligations to address the inequalities 
or needs the individual faces. All of these considerations should be, to some extent, context-
dependent, and exposed to further moral scrutiny and argumentation.  In the context of Indian 
commercial surrogacy, I am not convinced that achieving fairer contractual terms would 
erase gender-based inequalities, and not further entrench them. On the other hand, it is 
impossible to ignore the fact that imposing a ban or restriction will deprive individual women 
of a real change to improve their well-being and that of their families.  Nor does a ban or 
restriction in itself hardly advances the interest of women, unless significant progress is made 
in terms of addressing various existing inequalities. With exploitation, moral responsibility 
and moral force described this way, it is also become questionable whether the 2015 ban by 
the Indian government on non-Indian nationals commissioning surrogacy, which was 
reportedly motivated by a concern to prevent further exploitation of poor Indian women52, 
really does serve this purpose. If the deeper worry really is that of injustice and inequality, 
then Indian commissioning parents are equally involved in exploitative arrangements as are 
non-Indians. By adopting a normative position, which seems to suggest that only global 
commercial surrogacy is exploitative, the state disregards exploitation that occurs within its 
borders and brushes off its own moral responsibility with regards to exploitation.  
 
d. Objections and Limits to a Structural Injustice lens 
In the last section of this paper, I would like to consider two potential objections and 
limitations to a structural approach to exploitation. The first relates to consent and agency, 
the second concern relates to the scope of the structural approach.  
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It could be argued that a structural injustices, as I have described them really result in 
the agency of potential surrogates being eroded or compromised, and that in fact, what 
appears to be freely given consent, is in fact defective Stephen Wilkinson has argued that the 
exploitation necessarily involves a defect in consent and this worry is certainly not easily set 
aside in the current context 53. A recent study by Tanderup and colleagues in New Delhi 
suggests that information given to potential surrogates may in fact be inadequate, and that 
there is rampant paternalism on the part of the doctors around the decision-making procedure 
of surrogates.54 If consent is inadequate or missing, we are certainly dealing with a wrong, 
one that involves a lack of respect for autonomy, whether or not it also involves exploitation. 
It may well be, however, that women entering the surrogacy arrangement have considerable 
understanding of the risks and discomfort associated with pregnancy and giving birth, even if 
they are unaware of those specifically associated with surrogacy. More importantly however, 
I am willing to assume, that consent given in such situations can be both meaningful and 
valid. In fact, it is quite plausible that women choose to enter such arrangements despite fully 
understanding the risks, demands and discomforts. Given their alternatives, commercial 
surrogacy may in fact be a perfectly rational and reasonable choice, even when it is a difficult 
one.  In other words, describing an arrangement as exploitative need not necessarily 
undermine the rationality or agency of the exploited party.  
This question, I believe, is also at the heart of some of the clashes between the 
ethnographic and the normative discourses around global commercial surrogacy, and it is 
worth addressing here what has come to be known as the ‘ethnographic turn’ in the discourse 
around commercial surrogacy in India, a claim that finds its way various forms in many 
discussions pertaining to transnational, or transcultural ethics. Several ethnographers have 
suggested that the claim of exploitation, used as a moral lens, is a tool that Occidentalizes 
commercial surrogacy, fails to capture the realities of the practice, and treats the surrogates as 
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victims who need to be rescued. 55 The danger of victimizing surrogates and effacing their 
agency in the process of ensuring that they are protected, is one the reasons I have chosen to 
avoid using the term ‘vulnerability’ in my discussion of structural injustices, even though it is 
a term preferred by many scholars in their characterization of exploitation.56 While it may be 
true that the wrong of exploitation lies in taking advantage of a vulnerability, it then requires 
us to further define vulnerability to justify which kinds we think are relevant to exploitation.  
Current ethnographic work suggests that while many surrogates feel compelled to 
take on surrogacy work, these are not necessarily examples of coercion or severe erosion of 
agency, although it is possible that some women are, or feel coerced into accepting surrogacy 
work. I would rather argue that what is described as ‘majboori’, by one of the surrogates in 
Pande’s interviews, is compulsion in the face of the multitudes of injustices one faces57, 
where the choice to enter surrogacy seems to be an obvious way out of financial hardship, at 
least temporarily.  
Coming back to the concern raised by ethnographers: Pande begins one of her 
accounts by suggesting that the realities of surrogacy in India requires us to move away from 
an ethics and moral lens58. This is particularly surprising as the remainder of her paper is in 
fact filled with value-laden language when describing the desperate conditions potential 
surrogates face, as well as the injustices to which they are exposed. As Alison Bailey argues, 
while the ‘Western’ view may mistakenly put too much emphasis on reproductive autonomy 
or commodification, the alternative approach is certainly not the ‘moral absenteeism’ that that 
the ethnographers seems to encourage59. If the moral lens has the wrong target, it may 
certainly gain from being redirected by the ethnographers’ lens, but it doesn’t follow that 
such a lens is unnecessary. Rather, the ethnographic turn seems to be couched in a critique of 
liberal view of the moral agent, where consent and rationality reign and where an appeal to 
exploitation might signal powerlessness or lack of agency. A fairness approach to 
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exploitation, whether structural, transactional, or a combination of both, does not necessarily 
depend on the erosion of agency (although it can co-exist with such an account as well). As 
Young notes, the fact that structures and processes constrain ‘does not mean that they 
eliminate freedom: rather social-structural processes produce differentials in the kinds of 
range of options that individuals have for their choices’, they do not ‘constrain in the form of 
direct coercion of some individuals over others’. Rather, Young goes on to suggest that the 
central worry is ‘whether these differences in the kinds and range of options made available 
to an individual by these structures are fair’60 I have argued so far that they are not, in fact, 
fair.  
Alison Bailey has noted that ‘extending Western moral frameworks to Indian 
surrogacy work raises the specter of discursive colonialism along with concerns about how 
Western intellectual traditions distort, erase, and misread non-Western subjects’ lived 
experiences’. While context-sensitivity is particularly relevant in this case, we would do well 
not let the ‘spectre of discursive colonialism’61 push us towards either an ethics of relativism, 
or towards libertarian/anti-paternalist ethics, that might let consent do all the moral work. An 
relevant consideration in this exercise is the concern of adaptive preference, that is the 
situation in which an individual’s preferences are shaped to accord with the (frequently 
narrow) set of opportunities she actually has.62 In other words, being brought up to believe 
that education and employment are not meant for women, while child-bearing, child-rearing 
and various concerns around the households are, contribute to shaping the choice women 
make in these contexts, whether they in fact have as narrow set of choices in the first place, 
or whether they only believe this to be the case63. When Pande talks of ‘desperate’ women, or 
argues that commercial surrogacy work requires the perfect work ethic while tapping, as part 
of recruiting techniques, into the nurturing role women are expected to embody64, she also 
implicitly assumes a normative framework, but one that remains largely unacknowledged. 
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Considering relevant moral framework, as we are doing when examining whether global 
commercial surrogacy is exploitative, does not require us to either efface the agency of the 
surrogates or disregard their lived-experiences. Condemning a certain practice as 
exploitative, or unjust does not mean that women at the heart of such practices are unable to 
navigate ‘their own way to social change’65. In fact, the local movements of resistance (for 
example surrogates negotiating terms of their residence with wardens) that are described in 
Pande’s work can also construed within normative approaches as particular instances self-
determination, agency, and pragmatism, in the way ‘Western’ ethics, if there is such a thing, 
might also define them. 
Ignoring how much structures and processes shape individual choices however, might 
lead to problematic measures against exploitation. For example, one possible measure to 
minimize exploitation, as suggested by James Kirby, is to ensure that consent is informed and 
voluntary, by asking ‘members of the disadvantaged individual’s social group/community, 
including those who have had similar transactional experiences, to deliberate together to 
determine whether this condition is met’66. Such members would include other former 
surrogates, potential surrogates or members of the women’s communities. This is unlikely to 
entirely solve the concern of exploitation, even at a micro-fairness level because, as Panitch 
rightly suggests, even  ‘the surrogates social group might not know what a fair distribution of 
benefit would be’ 67. Moreover, a consideration of adaptive preference might suggest that 
most of the women within the community have been shaped by the same kinds of restriction 
as the surrogate herself. As such, a contextually-dependent standard of fair terms, even one 
developed in consultation with other women in the community, does very little to establish 
what is fair in this context, and even less so towards providing a complete picture of 
exploitation.  
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 The second set of objections to a structural approach asks firstly, whether the scope of 
a structural component is too broad, rendering an interaction under conditions of less than 
perfect equality exploitative, thereby entirely diluting the moral strength of the exploitation 
claim.  If this is not the case, and if exploitation is a feature of discrete interactions, then we 
may be forced to acknowledge that achieving fairer or best practices, could alleviate, if not 
entirely erase concerns of exploitation, also of the structural kind.  After all, if surrogacy can 
become a tool of empowerment, why not? 
On the first objection, I would argue that indeed, there is a fair chance that many 
arrangements under deep conditions of structural injustice would be considered exploitative. 
But this would partly depend on where the individual stands in relation to social structures 
and processes. For example, the interaction between an Indian luxury hotel owner and her 
high-income clients is unlikely to be one of exploitation, although the one between a badly 
paid busboy at the hotel and its owner or with the clients might well be. In the case of the 
busboy however, establishing better terms of exchange may well quench all concerns of 
exploitation, if truly the only structural issue here is one of economic inequality.  
Can this not be the case for surrogacy? If women can use one of the few assets they 
have as a tool of empowerment, however weak, perhaps the ethically sound response is to 
support the practice and ensure that surrogacy labour is carried out under fair conditions and 
fair contractual terms. Panitch has suggested that we must look at global inter-contractual 
comparisons in order to examine the fairness of existing arrangements. Such a comparison 
would include not only financial terms but other benefits, such as the freedom to pursue other 
interest during the contract, legal representation, etc. Benefits enjoyed by surrogates 
elsewhere, particularly in the United States68. She has also suggested making a series of 
comparative analyses across contracts, in order to help establish the standards Indian 
surrogates are entitled to. However, I remain suspicious of measures, be they inter-
		 18	
contractual comparisons (local or global), or a fair trade approaches,69 that would only make 
commercial surrogacy a more compelling, thereby further entrenching gender inequalities 
without signification additional measure to address background injustices.  
It seems that certain aspects of what makes the arrangement exploitative in this case 
cannot truly be addressed solely by terms, unlike with the case of the busboy. This is related 
to the fact that surrogacy work is gender-specific, the very characteristic that places women 
in positions of deep inequality in the first place.   
Let us take another example of exploitative labour: paid household work in India. 
Household work is a largely unregulated sector in India, often, but not exclusively performed 
by women and children. Pay tends to be minimal and conditions less than ideal. Workers 
usually have no access to formal labour law protection. Much of the working conditions are 
harsh and demeaning. Workers are often allowed to use the home toilets, sit anywhere other 
than the floor, use the same crockery as the rest of the family, take adequate breaks or time-
off work. Such conditions can be described as exploitative, both from the transactional and 
structural perspectives. As in the case of the busboy, these wrongs be alleviated by 
establishing better working condition. Not so for all types of household work. Usually, home 
toilets are cleaned by a different class of workers, who ‘specialize’ in cleaning both 
household and public toilets. A great many of these workers might not have chosen to enter 
such profession, but have been handed this work down through the generation, by virtue of 
belonging to the lowest caste, formerly referred to as the ‘untouchables’, historically and 
currently still one of the most deprived and oppressed communities in India. Despite the fact 
that both caste discrimination, and a large part of the work that these workers do, such as 
manual scavenging and the cleaning of dry latrines, has been banned in India, both practices 
are still prevalent. Children belonging to these castes often find themselves cleaning latrines 
for their classmates.  While further institutional provision can be taken to further eliminate 
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the degrading and inhumane conditions of such work, the moral wrong cannot be entirely 
eliminated until and unless individuals and communities find themselves completely free of 
caste and other social discrimination. This is not to suggest that surrogacy work shared any of 
the degrading and inhumane characteristics of latrine cleaning in India. However, this 
analogy does suggest that where the inequalities and injustices arise from more than material 
inequality, it is unlikely that solely focusing on the conditions of the work will erase all 
concerns of exploitation. Unless, such terms can be established in ways that are truly, 
sustainably empower, and eventually allowing women to achieve true equality. This, I 
believe can only be achieved by taking significant and urgent steps towards redressing 
structural injustice, in a manner that takes precedence over establishing fair terms of 
agreement.  
 
e. Conclusion 
Neither then two prevalent notions of exploitation, a liberal account, as developed by 
Wertheimer or respect-based approach that focuses on degradation, can fully account for why 
cases of global commercial surrogacy should be rightly described as exploitative. Although I 
start from a position that retains the concept of fairness as the central feature of the 
exploitation claim, I have moved away from a typically Wertheimerian approach, that 
focuses on the terms of an exchange, and described exploitation as a feature of structural 
inequalities and injustice. The upshot of this approach is a hybrid: an account of exploitation 
that has both a transactional and structural component, each of which may account for 
exploitation, to a greater or less extent, depending on the specific context of the exchange, 
and the socio-structural positions of the actors involved. While I remain agnostic as to 
whether current instances of commercial surrogacy should be severely restricted, or even 
banned in an effort to minimize or eliminate exploitation, the normative implication of this 
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approach is that addressing structural injustice is just as important, if not more crucial in 
addressing exploitation than is achieving fairer terms.  
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